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BOOK REVIEWS
THi;: EQUALITY oF STATES I?; INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Edwin De Witt Dickinson. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920. Harvard 'Studies
in Jurisprudence, Vol. III.) Pp. ix, 424The doctrine of equality has proved as alluring and deceptive in the
field of international as of municipal law. Until recently it has enjoyed
almost universal acceptance. By the early political philosophers it was
regarded as one of the immutable principles of the law of nature. To many
of our modern publicists it has likewise presented itself as the sole rational
basis upon. which the legal relations of states can be properly adjusted. The
very indefiniteness of the conception has served to commend it to popular
favor. It seemed to voice the spirit of democracy in its vindication of the
rights of the weak as against the strong. In the smaller states, in particular,
the doctrine has been raised to the dignity of a religious creed; it has come
to be looked upon as the veritable ark of the covenant. upon which the
grasping hands of the more powerful states cannot be placed without endangering the peace of the world and even civilization itself.
On the other hand, it must: be admitted that the publicists have often
been troubled by the strange elusiveness of this so-catled fundamental principle. The doctrine seemed to evade, if not to defy, strict legal definition.
In certain quarters this characteristic has raised a suspicion as to the scientific value of the principle itself. Nevertheless, the majority of jurists continued to accept it as an article of faith, even though they were sometimes
prone to express grave doubts as to its strict applicability in this wicked
and perverse world.
To statesmen of the more powerful nations the doctrine has proved to
be a veritable thorn in the flesh. They were generally prepared to recognize
it in legal theory, but they were more frequently found to repudiate it in
practice. The doctrine was, and is, manifestly incompatible with the facts
of international life. Inequality, and not equality, is the essential characteristic of the relations of states both inside and without the circle of nations.
The great powers have established an hegemony against which the smaller
states have _protested in vain. The age-long struggle between law and politics has been here transferred to the international sphere.
It has required no little courage on the part of the author to tackle this
most perplexing question. Fortunately, Professor Dickinson is singularly
well equipped both in scholarship and judgmc:nt to undertake the task. His
study reveals a remarkable familiarity with the literature of international
law, both ancient and modern, together with a thorough understanding of
recent developments in diplomatic history and comparative government. The
1·esult is one of the most scholarly monographs of recent years in the field
of international law.
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This volume covers a wide range of subject-matter, including many
phases of legal history, rechts philosophic, comparative government and practio,al politics. On the historical side the author has traced the origin of the
principle of state equality back to the "applications to nations of theories of
natural law, the state of nature and natural equality." This conception, it
is interesting to learn, was not a part of the system of Grotius, but was the
product of the naturalistic philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The doctrine was "subsequsmtly reinforceable by theories of sovereignty," and th~s became "one of the primary postulates of le droit des
gens thorique."
The theoretical phases of the subject involve an analysis of the divergent
interpretations of the phrase "equality of nations." A clear-cut distinction
is drawn between equality in the sense of equality before the law,· or, as it is
often expressed, the equal protection of the laws, and equality in the sense of
an absolute equality of rights and possibly of obligations. The former of these
conceptio~s, as the author points out, is essential to the existence of any legal
system, whether municipal or international. Moreover, it is co...,,.:ltible "with
the grouping of states into classes and the attributing to the members of
each class of a status which is a measure of capacity for rights.A
It is qqite otherwise with the second conception of equality which ascribes
to all natiohs the possession and enjoyment of exactly the same rights and
privileges. This conception is a pure, juristic abstraction of naturalistic origin
and quite irreconcilable with the facts of present day international relations.
The theory is usually presented, ho~ever, in the m~dified form of an equality
not of rights but of capacity for rights. In this form, the doctrine represents a democratic ideal which the nations ought ever to keep before them
in the devel~pment of the· principles of international law.
Turning, then, to the more practical aspects of his subject, the author
proceeds to examine in detail some of the most important legal 1imitations
upon the equality of states. These limitations he classifies as either internal
or external, or as constitutional or international, in character; that is to say,
they may be imposed by the fundamental law of the state, or they may arise
out of a state's peculiar relations with other members of the international
community.
The chapter on the nature of the internal limitations on state equality
is perhaps the least satisfactory in the whole work. The reciprocal relations
of constitutional and international law, it roust be admitted, have never been
satisfactorily worked out. These relations vary not only from state to state
but also raise many knotty legal questions within the states themselves. For
example, the nature and range of the treaty-making power of the crown is
stm a disputed question in the English constitution. It is little wonder, in
the circumstances, that. Professor Dickinson has not succeeded in avoiding
all of the treacherous pitfalls which waylay the investigator. Two or three
of these difficulties may be briefly mentioned. Throughout this discussion
the author often seems to identify the legal capacity of the executive with
the power. of the state itself. No clear distinction is drawn between the st:lte
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and the government of the state. The body politic, it is true, can act only
through its duly constituted organs, so that for al! practical purposes a cor-stitutional limitation upon the capacity of the executive in respect to foreign
affairs does operate as a restriction upon the international competency of
the state. The distinction, nevertheless, should not be overlooked, since
many of these limitations are concerned with the constitutional principle of
the division of powers rather than with the international contractual capacity
of the state itself.
Mtich more serious, however, is the author's tendency to read American
legal principles into the interpretation of foreign constitutiom.. The political
philosophy of John Marshall has taken hold upon him and has permeated
all his thinking. But the constitutions of many foreign states have not the
sacrosanct character of that of the United States. They are not the supreml"
law of the land in· the strict American sense; on the contrary, they partake
much more of the character of political than of legal instruments of government. This must needs be the case wherever the political organs of the
stat!:, and not the judicial, are made the guardians and final interpreters of
the· constitution. Many of the provisions, therefore, which seemingly impose
important limitations upon the capacity of the state ought properly to be
regarded in the light of political maxims rather 'than as true legal inhibitions.
In other words, they are intended for the guidance of the executive or legislative departments of the government and not for the judiciary. For example,
a member of the Swiss national assembly, 'it is safe to assert, would be
greatly astonished to learn that Article 29 of the constitution, providing for
the levying of low import duties upon certain articles, restricted the leg;:l
power of the state to enter into commercial agreements with outside nations.
That the provision has not so worked out in practice is amply demonstrated
by the adoption of a higher and higher scale of protective duties.
It is somewhat surprising at first to find tbat certain conventional limitations upon the war- and treaty-making powers of the British Empire are
incorporated into the discussion of the general question of the le~al competency of states. That there is ample warrant for treating the convention-;
of the British constitution as of equal value to the law of the constitution
may well lie admitted, but the author ought certainly to have explained the
fundamental difference in character between the two, both from the international and constitutional standpoint. In the same connection, it may likewise
be proper to add that Canada was not the first, nor is it the only self-govern··
ing colony to establish a department of external affairs whose authority
encroaches, in fact if not in theory, upon the legal unity and supremacy of
the English executive.
Even more surprising, however, is the 'llUthor's failure to apply his realistic methods of investigation to the consideration of the practical value of
many of these constitutional limitations in respect to foreign affairs. The
principle of historical criticism ought to be equally applicable to constitutional provisions as to political theories. For example, the constitutional
prohibition. of the alienation of national territory is of singularly little value
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to a defeated nation, as Turkey can testify. In all such cases it is evident
that the right of conquest as recognized by international law overrules the
express inhibitJon of the constitution. In other words, a constitutional provision regarding territorial intcogrity cannot be applied in the face of superiot
force.· For all practical purposes, all such constitutional provisions have no
international validity and do not operate as limitations upon the inherent
power of the state to cede territory in case of necessity.
The chapter on tlie limitation of the political equality of states contains
much new and interesting material. The author brings out clearly the
essential distinction between the legal equality of stat~s and their political
equality in respect to international organization, and finds little difficulty in
demonstrating the inapplicability of the principle of political equality to the
great deliberative conferences of our day. No legal fiction can possibly
place Hayti and Panama on an actual political equality with the United
States or the great European powers. To disregard the existing disproportions in size, population and resources of the various states would violate
the fundamental principle of democracy itself by placing the direction oi
the ~rld's affairs in the hands of an insignificant minority of its inhabitants.
As the author well states, "insist>ence upon the complete political equality
in the constituting and functioning of an international . union, tribunal or
concert is simply another way of denying the possibility of effective international organization."
The supplementary chapter on the equality of nations at the Paris Conference is disappointing. It has manifestly been added as an after-thought
in an attempt to bring the study up to date. It is, perhaps, too much to
expect the author f;o add to his erudition as a scholar the still greater gift
of prophesy, but the public had every reason to believe from the high quality
of the preceding chapters that the discussion would involve something more
than a repetitious resume of some of the chief provisions of the treaty.
Notwithstanding this anti-climax, the book stands forth as a distinct
landmark in the development of the principles of international law. There
have been more than ~nough general text-books on international law. The
need has long been manifest for a critical analysis of some of the so-called
fundamental principles of the subject: The war, fortunately, has swept away
many of the shams and fictions which have detracted from the true legal
character of international law. The time has now come to rebuild its principles upon the sure foundation of international facts. To this great undertaking Professor Dickinson has made a most important contribution. He
bas attacked one of the most sacred of these intematiopal fictions and has.
made out an irrefutable case for a reconstruction of both the theory and
practice of representation. The volume, in short, is a worthy addition to
the Harvard Studies in Jurisprudence. It is sincerely to be hoped that this
is only th~ first of a series of studies by the author in this general field.
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